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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court’s jurisdiction rests upon Utah Code Annotated Section 78A-4-103(2)(j)
(2009).
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue #1: Did the trial court correctly award Petitioners’ title to the Property
in question via a constructive trust?
Standard of review: Some discretion. In highly fact dependant questions, such as
this, the trial court is given some discretion in applying the law to a given set of facts.
See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994). “[I]n equity cases such as this is,
this court may review the facts. However, it has long been established and reiterated by
this court in numerous cases that due to the advantaged position of the trial court we will
review its findings and judgments with considerable indulgence, and will not disagree
with and upset them unless the evidence clearly preponderates against them, or the court
has mistaken or misapplied the law applicable thereto.” Pagano v. Walker, 539 P.2d 452,
454 (Utah 1975). “We apply this standard of review in cases involving trusts which arise
by operation of law . . . .” In re Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111, 1114 (Utah 1982).
Preservation for appeal: R. at 1053-54.

Issue #2: Did the trial court err in denying Petitioners’ request for attorneys’
fees under sections 75-3-719 and 75-1-310 of the Utah Code?
Standard of review: Correctness. “Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an
action is a question of law, which we review for correctness.” Valcarce v. Fitzgerald,
961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998).
Preservation for appeal: R. at 1057-58.
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Issue #3: Did the trial court err in granting Defendants’ motion for stay and
other relief upon appeal under Rule 62 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, despite
Utah law stating that a stay and a supersedeas bond is not appropriate where, as
here, there is a self-executing judgment?
Standard of review: Correctness. A court’s interpretation of a rule is a conclusion
of law, which is reviewed for correctness. See Loporto v. Hoegemann, 1999 UT App
175, ¶ 5, 982 P.2d 586.
Preservation for appeal: Petitioners’ Opposition to Motion for Stay & Other
Relief upon Appeal.1

1

Filed on March 11, 2008. This document was omitted from the 2nd Supplemental
Judgment Roll and Index and therefore does not have a record citation.
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CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following statutory provisions are materially relevant to this appeal, and a
copy of each is attached in Addendum A:
Statute of Limitation
Utah Code Ann. §78B-2-307(1)(a).
Probate Code: Intestate Estate
Utah Code Ann. § 75-8-101(2)(b).
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-102(1)(b).
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-102(2).
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-103(1).
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-206.
Attorneys Fees
Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-310.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-719.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves a dispute over a decedent’s property located at 2727 North
Canyon Road, Provo, Utah (“the Property”). The trial court properly awarded Petitioners
the Property. However, Petitioners appeal the trial court’s decision to not award them
their attorneys’ fees and to grant Respondent a stay pending appeal.
Procedural History
In February 2005, Petitioners/Appellees filed a Petition to Set Aside Personal
Representative’s Transfers from Decedent’s Estate. (R. at 28-34.) In October 2006,
Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment. (R. at 511-619.) Respondent’s motion
was denied. (R. at 801-02.) A bench trial was then held on November 13-14, and
December 6, 2007. After the bench trial, the court awarded the Property to the Petitioners
via a constructive trust. (R. at 1178-79.) The trial court awarded Petitioners their costs
but declined to award them their attorneys’ fees. (R. at 1180.) Both Respondent and
Petitioners filed notices of appeal. In March 2008, Respondent filed a Motion for Stay
and Other Relief Upon Appeal. (R. at 1193-1201.) The trial court granted Respondent a
stay pending appeal. Petitioners filed a second notice of appeal with respect to the stay.
Statement of Facts2
Harold LeFevre (“Harold”) and his wife Edith had seven children (Petitioners Hal
LeFevre, Julia Richmond, Jeffrey LeFevre, Kelly LeFevre, Daniel LeFevre, Bryce

2

Because Respondent “is not directly challenging the trial court’s findings” of fact, these
facts are taken largely from those findings of fact and are undisputed. See Brief of
Appellant, p. 7 n.38. The findings of fact and conclusions of law are in Addendum B.
5

LeFevre and Cynthia Giles). (R. at 1173.) Harold and Edith owned the Property at 2727
North Canyon Road, Provo, Utah as joint tenants. Id. Edith passed away in 1987. Id.
Harold had sole title to the Property after Edith’s death. Id. Harold later married Ellen
Stout LeFevre (“Ellen”), who already had five children from a previous marriage (one of
whom is Respondent Leland Stout) and who had her own home and property. Id. Harold
and Ellen lived on the Property (Harold’s home and the Property at issue in this appeal)
during their marriage. Id. On March 19, 1993, Harold died intestate. Id.
On March 24, 1993, after Harold’s funeral, Ellen called the seven LeFevre
children together and admitted that she did not own the Property and asked them for
permission to live on it. (R. at 1173-74.) Ellen and Petitioners verbally agreed that (a)
Ellen would be allowed to stay on the Property until her death, and (b) that all of Ellen’s
and Harold’s assets would be put into a trust to be distributed at Ellen’s death, with
Harold’s estate going to his children and Ellen’s estate going to her children. (R. at
1174.) Petitioners trusted Ellen and sought to maintain a good relationship with her. Hal
took Ellen on vacation with his family shortly after Harold’s death, and Bryce LeFevre
continued to visit Ellen throughout the years. (R. at 1174, 1175.) Ellen’s attorney
testified that all he observed was a good relationship between Ellen and Petitioners. (R. at
1178.) Ellen never indicated to Petitioners that she had changed her mind about the terms
of the agreement. (R. at 1176-77.) In fact, Ellen reaffirmed to Bryce LeFevre in 2001
that everything was set up according to their agreement. (Transcript 11/13/2007, pp. 19698.)
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On April 19, 1993, Ellen executed a will and the Ellen L. LeFevre Trust (“the
trust”). (R. at 1174.) The trust included the Petitioners as beneficiaries but split the trust
estate between the two families without regard to specific divisions of particular assets.
(R. at 1174-75.) Ellen was the trustee. On July 23, 1993, as the personal representative
of Harold’s estate, Ellen transferred the Property into the trust. (R. at 1175.) On June 13,
1994, Ellen amended the trust and specifically divided the Property between Petitioners
and her children. Id. On September 11, 1995, Respondent took Ellen to her attorney’s
office where she amended the trust a second time. Id. The second amendment took the
Petitioners entirely out of the trust as beneficiaries. (R. at 1175-76.) The Petitioners were
never notified of these amendments or given copies of the trust documents, even though
the new provisions violated the parties’ agreement. Id.
Ellen passed away on October 28, 2004. (R. at 1176.) The Stouts did not notify
Petitioners of her death, id., even though Respondent knew LeFevre children that lived a
couple of blocks down the road. (Transcript 11/13/2007, p. 174.) The Stout did not
publish the obituary Ellen specifically prepared for publication upon her death. (R. at
1176.) In fact, the Stouts hurriedly buried Ellen without embalming her, had the house
appraised, and were in the process of selling it to Respondent’s nephew when Petitioners
learned of Ellen’s death. (Transcript 11/13/2007, pp. 128-30, 172-74.) The Stout
children intended to disadvantage Petitioners by never making any effort to notify them of
Ellen’s death and to exclude Petitioners from any participation in the distribution of
Ellen’s estate. (R. at 1177.) Because of this, Petitioners did not discover that Ellen had
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passed away until weeks after her death and did not become aware of Ellen’s breach until
they discovered she had passed away, contacted her attorney, and received copies of the
trust documents. (R. at 1177-78.) Immediately upon this discovery, on February 28,
2005,3 Petitioners filed a Petition to Set Aside Personal Representative’s Transfers from
Decedent’s Estate. (R. at 28-34, 1178.) In addition, the Petitioners requested that Hal
LeFevre become the successor personal representative of Harold’s estate. (R. at 61-72.)
Petitioners are entitled to the Property via their agreement with Ellen and under the
Utah probate code. Harold’s probate estate is still open and before the courts. The
evidence at trial showed that Harold’s net intestate estate totaled $113,840.11. (Trial
Exhibit, Tab 96.)4 Since Ellen received $203,954.07 in nonprobate transfers, Petitioners
are entitled to receive the entire intestate amount. (Trial Exhibit, Tab 97.) They filed
their Petition in order to recover the Property wrongfully transferred away by Ellen and,
in the alternative, to recover their share of Harold’s estate.

3

The mailing certificate on the petition states that it was mailed on February 28, 2005.
The Fourth District Court stamped the petition as filed on February 29, 2005, a date that
does not exist. For the purposes of this appeal, it does not matter whether it was filed on
February 28, 2005 or March 1, 2005.

4

Cited trial exhibits are included in Addendum C.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly awarded Petitioners the Property at issue. The trial court
used its broad equitable powers to fashion a remedy for the damages suffered by
Petitioners. In order to prevent unjust enrichment, a constructive trust arose by operation
of law. The constructive trust was an appropriate remedy and did not need to be pled as a
cause of action by Petitioners. Further, Petitioners are legally entitled to the Property by
operation of Utah’s probate laws. Thus, the trial court correctly awarded them the
Property, and this Court should affirm the trial court’s award.
The trial court correctly found that Ellen had a confidential, fiduciary relationship
with Petitioners and that she breached her duties to them by changing the terms of her
trust. Ellen had a fiduciary relationship with Petitioners as trustee of her trust; Ellen had a
fiduciary relationship with Petitioners as personal representative of Harold’s estate; and
Ellen had a confidential relationship with Petitioners by virtue of the contract she entered
into with them. Ellen breached her fiduciary, confidential relationship with Petitioners
when she fraudulently changed the terms of her trust and deprived them of their share of
their father’s estate.
Finally, the trial court correctly found that no statute of limitation defense barred
Petitioners’ recovery. First, Respondent waived the affirmative defense of statute of
limitation by failing to assert it in his responsive pleading. Second, Petitioners filed their
petition within the statute of limitation, as tolled by the equitable discovery rule.
However, the trial court erred in failing to award Petitioners their attorneys’ fees as
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incurred in bringing this action. The probate code permits personal representatives to
recover their costs and fees incurred in bringing or defending an action on behalf of the
estate. There currently is no personal representative for Harold’s estate. Petitioners filed
a motion to have Hal LeFevre appointed as successor personal representative. Petitioners
stood in the shoes of a personal representative and brought this action in good faith.
Further, the probate code permits trial courts to award any party to a probate action costs
and fees. In this case, justice requires that Petitioners recoup their attorneys’ fees and
costs. But for Ellen’s fraud and Respondent’s deception, Petitioners would not have had
to bring this costly and protracted action. Under either statute, Ellen’s estate should be
required to pay for Petitioners’ attorneys’ fees.
In addition, the trial court erred in granting Respondent a stay pending appeal. The
judgment in this case was self-executing because it, on its face, granted title of the
Property to Petitioners. Where, as in this case, a judgment is self-executing, a stay and
bond are ineffective. Utah law clearly states that where a judgment is self-executing, an
appeal cannot stay the force and effect of the judgment. Petitioners were damaged by the
trial court’s imposition of an improper stay. They had all of the responsibilities and
liabilities of ownership, without the ability to properly protect their interest.
This Court should therefore affirm the trial court’s decision that Petitioners are the
owners of the Property. This Court should reverse the trial court’s failure to award
Petitioners their attorneys’ fees and to award Respondent a stay pending appeal and
remand for a determination of attorneys fees’ and damages.

10

ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly awarded the Property to Petitioners and its judgment
should be affirmed. This case came before the trial court as an equity proceeding in a
probate case. After a two-day bench trial, the trial court found that, based on the facts in
evidence, a constructive trust arose by law to prevent unjust enrichment. The trial court’s
application of the law to the facts is granted some deference in view of the fact that
questions involving constructive trusts are highly factual questions. See State v. Pena,
869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994); Pagano v. Walker, 539 P.2d 452, 454 (Utah 1975); In
re Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111, 1114 (Utah 1982).
Respondent declares that he “is not directly challenging the trial court’s findings”
of fact. Brief of Appellant, p. 7 n.38. However, to the extent Respondent does indirectly
challenge the trial court’s findings, he “must first marshal all the evidence in support of
the findings and then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings . . . .” Grayson Roper Ltd. P’ship
v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989) (quoted in Ockey v. Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, ¶
34 n.32, 189 P.3d 51). Respondent has failed to marshal the evidence and demonstrate
that they do not support the district court’s findings. Each of the district court’s findings
is supported by the evidence.
Petitioners appeal only the trial’s courts failure to award them their attorneys’ fees
and improper grant of a stay pending appeal. Both of these issues involve questions of
law and are therefore reviewed for correctness, granting no deference to the trial court.
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Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998); Loporto v. Hoegemann, 1999 UT
App 175, ¶ 5, 982 P.2d 586. Though, in some respects, the issue of the stay pending
appeal is now moot, this issue should be heard and decided by this court because it is
“capable of repetition yet evading review.” In re Johnson, 2001 UT 110, ¶ 15, 48 P.3d
881.
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED PETITIONERS TITLE
TO THE PROPERTY.
Petitioners are legally entitled to the Property at issue. First, the trial court

correctly found that Petitioners were entitled to the Property because a constructive trust
arose as a matter of law. Second, the trial court correctly found that Petitioners had a
confidential relationship with Ellen and that she breached her duty to Petitioners when
she transferred the Property to her children. Finally, the trial court correctly found that no
statute of limitation issue barred Petitioners’ recovery.
A.

The Trial Court Correctly Awarded Petitioners Title To The Property.

Petitioners are entitled to the Property at issue. A trial court has broad
discretionary powers, particularly in cases of equity, to fashion appropriate remedies. The
trial court properly found that a constructive trust arose as a matter of law to remedy the
unjust enrichment caused by Ellen’s misdeeds. Further, even if the court incorrectly
granted Petitioners title to the Property via a constructive trust, Petitioners were legally
entitled to the Property by operation of probate law.
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1.

The trial court used its broad discretionary powers to do equity
in this case by finding that a constructive trust arose as a matter
of law.

The trial court correctly awarded Petitioners the Property via a constructive trust.
Trial courts have inherent powers to do equity in the cases before them. For example,
“[w]here land, or any estate therein, is the subject-matter of the agreement, the
inadequacy of the legal remedy is well settled, and the equitable jurisdiction is firmly
established.” Decorso v. Thomas, 50 P.2d 951, 956 (Utah 1935) (citation omitted). “The
regulation and enforcement of trusts is one of the original and inherent powers of a court
of equity, and with the exception of such as are given to other courts, the jurisdiction of
equity in all cases of trusts, express or implied, resulting or constructive, is unquestioned,
especially where matters of account are involved.” Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis
added). “We would turn the doctrine of equitable estoppel upon its head if we were to
hold that the power to correct an inequity as unjust as the one here, would, without more,
defeat our courts’ inherent power to seek and to do equity.” Eldredge v. Utah State
Retirement Bd., 795 P.2d 671, 678 (Utah App. 1990) (emphasis added).
The trial court in this case used its broad equitable powers to do justice in this case
via the remedy of a constructive trust. The Utah Supreme Court has clearly held that a
“constructive trust is an equitable remedy.” Peirce v. Peirce, 2000 UT 7, ¶ 12, 994 P.2d
193. A constructive trust is imposed to “prevent one for unjustly profiting through fraud
or the violation of a duty imposed under a fiduciary or confidential relationship” and is
created when “a person acquires the legal title to property of another by means of an
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intentional false or fraudulent verbal promise to hold the same for a certain purpose, and,
having thus obtained the title, retains and claims the property as his own.” Hawkins v.
Perry, 123 Utah 16, 23, 253 P.2d 372, 375 (1953) (citation omitted). A constructive trust
is still found when “at the time of the transfer the transferee intended to perform the
agreement, and even though he was not guilty of undue influence in procuring the
conveyance. The abuse of the confidential relation consists merely in the failure of the
transferee to perform his promise.” Id. at 376 (citation omitted).
In Acott v. Tomlinson, the Utah Supreme Court decided a case with facts
substantially similar to the present case. 337 P.2d 720 (Utah 1959). Defendant
Tomlinson, his mother, and his six siblings owned mining shares left to them by their
father. Id. at 722. Tomlinson wrote letters to his mother and six siblings, asking them to
quitclaim their shares to him. Id. at 723. He stated that he would hold the shares for their
benefit and that he would “account for all money and stock received therefrom.” Id.
Tomlinson thereafter claimed all of the property for himself. Id. His siblings brought
suit. The court found that from the fact “there is ample basis for the determination made
by the trial court that the defendant agreed to hold the property under an express trust; or
alternatively, that the transaction was so unfair and lacking in disclosure of material facts
to plaintiffs to require the imposition of a constructive trust on the property for their
benefit.” Id. at 724.
As in Tomlinson, the evidence presented in this case provide ample basis for the
trial court’s determination that the transaction was so unfair and lacking in disclosure of
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material facts to Petitioner to require the imposition of a constructive trust on the Property
for their benefit. In this case, the trial court used its equitable powers to craft a fair
remedy. Though Petitioners did not plead constructive trust as a cause of action, the facts
giving rise to a constructive trust are pled in their petition. At trial, the trial court found
that the facts gave rise to a constructive trust. Ellen did not own the Property. (R. at
1174.) She acquired title to it by means of a fraudulent verbal promise to Petitioners to
hold it for them. Id. And then she retained title and disposed of it as she wished. (R. at
1175-76.) A constructive trust was needed to prevent Ellen and her children from
unjustly profiting through fraud and violation of a confidential and fiduciary relationship.
Petitioners entered into an agreement with Ellen in good faith, and she breached that
agreement.
2.

Even if the trial court erred in finding a constructive trust,
Petitioners are legally entitled to the Property by virtue of the
probate estate.

Petitioners are entitled to their share of their father’s estate. The trial court
correctly applied current probate law to this case. The Utah Uniform Probate Code
specifically states
The code applies to any proceeding in court then pending or thereafter
commenced regardless of the time of the death of decedent except to the extent
that in the opinion of the court the former procedure should be made applicable
in a particular case in the interest of justice or because of the infeasibility of
application of the procedure of this code.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-8-101(2)(b). The code directs that all cases be decided under the
current probate law unless any of the exceptions apply. The trial court found that
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Respondent did not argue that any of the exceptions applied in this case. (R. at 1178.)
Therefore, Respondent cannot argue that the exceptions, and therefore the older versions
of the probate code, apply on appeal. Further, this case was still pending when the
current probate laws were adopted. Therefore, the above statute indicates that the current
statutes apply and there is no issue of retroactive application.
Under the current law, the “intestate share of a decedent's surviving spouse is the
first $50,000, plus 1/2 of any balance of the intestate estate, if one or more of the
decedent’s surviving descendants are not descendants of the surviving spouse.” Id. § 752-102(1)(b). All of the nonprobate transfers received by the surviving spouse are
deducted from her share of the intestate estate. Id. § 75-2-102(2). Under 75-2-206,
nonprobate transfers to the surviving spouse are defined as “all property that passed
outside probate at the decedent’s death from the decedent to the surviving spouse by
reason of the decedent’s death.” Id. § 75-2-206. After the surviving spouse’s net share of
the intestate estate is calculated and distributed, the remainder of the estate passes “to the
decedent’s descendants per capita at each generation as defined in Subsection 75-2106(2).” Id. § 75-2-103(1).
At trial, Petitioners presented evidence that the assets in Harold’s probate estate
totaled $211,363.38.5 The debts in the probate estate, including the mortgage on the

5

Respondent argues that he presented conflicting evidence of the value of Harold’s
probate estate and nonprobate transfers at trial. However, the trial court specifically
found that Respondent was not a credible witness as to any of the issues in the case. (R.
at 1177.)
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Property, totaled $98,200.08, leaving a net probate estate of $113,163.30. (Trial Exhibit,
Tab 96.) Under the surviving spouse statute, Ellen would have been entitled to
$81,581.65 of the probate estate. However, that total is offset by any nonprobate transfers
Ellen received as a result of Harold’s death. The nonprobate transfers to Ellen totaled
$181,324.25.6 (Trial Exhibit, Tab 97.) The evidence therefore showed that Ellen
therefore received more than the surviving spouse’s share and the entire probate estate of
$113,163.30 should have been distributed to Petitioners.7 Since the Property was
included in the probate estate, Petitioners are entitled to the Property either by operation
of a constructive trust as a result of Ellen’s fraud or by operation of the probate statutes.
B.

The Trial Court Correctly Found That Petitioners Had A Confidential
or Fiduciary Relationship With Ellen LeFevre, Which She Breached.

Ellen LeFevre, by her actions, created confidential and fiduciary relationships with
Petitioners. Under Utah law, a confidential or fiduciary relationship exists in a variety of
circumstances. The “personal representative of a decedent . . . stands in a fiduciary
relationship to the creditors and heirs of the deceased.” Overturf v. Univ. of Utah Med.
Ctr., 1999 UT 3, ¶ 11, 973 P.2d 413. A trustee owes “fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries
of the trust.” Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Bd. of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 918

6

Thus, even if, as Respondent argues, Ellen is credited for the entire $64,144.22
mortgage that was marital debt and therefore half hers, Ellen still received a net of
$117,180.03. That amount is $35,598.38 more than she was entitled to under the
surviving spouse statute.

7

Because Harold’s estate is still before the trial court, the trial court had the authority to
directly transfer the Property to Petitioners. The court did not, as Respondent argues,
need to place the Property back in the probate estate prior to awarding it to Petitioners.
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(Utah 1993). And a “fiduciary or confidential relationship may be created by contract . . .
.” Wardley Corp. v. Welsh, 962 P.2d 86, 90 n.5 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting Hal Taylor
Assocs. v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 748 (Utah 1982)).
In this case, the evidence showed that Ellen had a confidential and fiduciary
relationship with Petitioners by virtue of three different positions. First, Ellen owed
Petitioners fiduciary duties because of her status as the personal representative of their
father’s estate and their status as heirs of the estate. (R. at 1175.) Second, Ellen owed
Petitioners fiduciary duties because of her status as the trustee of her trust and their status
as beneficiaries of that trust. (R. at 1174-75.) Finally, Ellen had a confidential
relationship with Petitioners by virtue of the contract she made with them with respect to
the Property. (R. at 1174.)
The trial court correctly found that Ellen LeFevre “abused [her] confidential,
fiduciary relationship with the LeFevre children when she (and the Stout children)
changed the material terms and conditions of the agreement.” (R. at 1174.) A trustee
owes a duty of loyalty to the beneficiaries, which requires her “to act only for the benefit
of the beneficiaries and to exercise prudence and skill in administering the trust.” Nat’l
Parks & Conservation Ass’n, 869 P.2d at 918. Ellen was the personal representative of
the Decedent’s estate and the trustee of the trust created from her agreement with
Petitioners. As the personal representative, Ellen had the duty to distribute the decedent’s
estate according to the probate code. As the trustee, Ellen had the duty to distribute the
Property in the trust according to her agreement with Petitioners. However, the evidence
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showed that Ellen breached her contract with Petitioners as well as her duties to them as
personal representative and as trustee when she fraudulently changed the terms of her
trust to exclude Petitioners.
C.

The Trial Court Correctly Found That Petitioners’ Petition Was Not
Barred By A Statute Of Limitation Issue.

No statute of limitation issue bars Petitioners’ right to recovery in this case. First,
Respondent waived the defense of a lapsed statute of limitation when he failed to assert it
in his objection to Petitioners’ petition. Second, even if Respondent did not waive the
defense, Petitioners filed their petition well within the applicable statute of limitation.
1.

Respondent waived his right to assert the affirmative defense of
a lapsed statute of limitation by failing to assert it in his
responsive pleading.

Because Respondent failed to assert a statute of limitations defense in his
Objection to Petitioners’ Petition to Set Aside Personal Representative Transfers from
Decedent’s Estate, he waived the right to assert the defense. Under Utah law, a “party
waives a statute of limitations defense by failing to raise it in a responsive pleading or by
motion before submitting a responsive filing.” Keller v. Southwood N. Med. Pavilion,
959 P.2d 102, 106 (Utah 1998); Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h). In this case, Petitioners filed a
Petition to Set Aside Personal Representative Transfers from Decedent’s Estate. (R. at
28-29.) Respondent filed his responsive pleading in the form of an objection to the
petition. (R. at 76-91.) In his objection, Respondent makes no mention of a statute of
limitations defense. Id. He therefore waived the defense and cannot properly assert the
defense on appeal.
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2.

Even if Respondent did not waive his right to assert a statute of
limitations defense, Petitioners filed their petition within the
applicable statute of limitation.

Petitioners filed their petition within the applicable statute of limitation. The
following statute of limitation applies to Petitioners’ action:
“An action may be brought within four years: (1) after the last charge is made
or the last payment is received: (a) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not
founded upon an instrument in writing.”
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-307(1)(a).
The general rule regarding statutes of limitations is that they start running “upon
the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action.” Russell
Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, ¶ 20, 108 P.3d 741 (citation omitted).
However, the equitable discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations “until the discovery
of facts forming the basis for the cause of action.” Id. at ¶ 21 (citation omitted). “The
applicability of a statute of limitations and the applicability of the discovery rule are
questions of law, which [are] review[ed] for correctness.” Id. at ¶ 18 (quoting Spears v.
Warr, 2002 UT 24, ¶ 32, 44 P.3d 742).
The equitable discovery rule will toll a statute of limitations if either (1) “a
plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action because of the defendant’s
concealment or misleading conduct” or (2) “the case presents exceptional circumstances
and the application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any
showing that the defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of action.” Id. at ¶
25 (citation omitted).
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Under the concealment version of the equitable discovery rule, the plaintiff must
first make a prima facie case showing that the defendant committed fraudulent
concealment. Charlesworth v. Reyns, 2005 UT App 214, ¶ 25, 113 P.3d 1031.
Fraudulent concealment requires that a person with “a legal duty or obligation to
communicate certain facts remain[s] silent or otherwise act[s] to conceal material facts
known to him.” Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 333 (Utah 1997). Utah courts
find fraudulent concealment when a fiduciary breaches his or her duty to “speak the
truth.” Charlesworth, 2005 UT App 214, ¶ 26 (“A fiduciary’s breach of the ‘duty to
speak the truth’ is sufficient to establish fraudulent concealment.”) (citations omitted).
The plaintiff must then show that “‘(1) they neither knew nor reasonably should have
known of the facts underlying their causes of action before the . . . limitations period
expired; or (2) notwithstanding their actual or constructive knowledge of the facts
underlying their causes of action within the limitations period, Plaintiffs acted reasonably’
by delaying the filing of a complaint until after the expiration of the limitations period.”
Id. at ¶ 25 (citation omitted). The policy behind this rule was discussed by the Utah
Supreme Court:
If we were to look only to whether a plaintiff theoretically could have brought
a suit before the limitations period expired without looking to the relative
reasonableness or unreasonableness of that action under the circumstances, we
would reward a defendant's fraudulent and deceptive misbehavior by depriving
an innocent plaintiff of a reasonable period within which to act. This we
refuse to do. “[T]o permit one practicing a fraud and then concealing it to
plead the statute of limitations when, in fact, the injured party did not know of
and could not with reasonable diligence have discovered the fraud” would be
“not only subversive of good morals, but also contrary to the plainest
principles of justice.”
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Russell Packard, 2005 UT 14, ¶ 28 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). Inquiry or
constructive notice is found “only at that point at which a plaintiff, reasonably on notice
to inquire into a defendant’s wrongdoing, would have . . . discovered the facts . . . despite
the defendant’s efforts to conceal [them].” Charlesworth, 2005 UT App 214, ¶ 29.
The determination of whether a plaintiff would reasonably discover facts is a
“highly fact-dependent legal question.” Id. at ¶ 30 (citation omitted). Therefore, the legal
question of whether a statute of limitation has been tolled is also a fact question, and the
fact finder should be given some deference in its determination. See State v. Pena, 869
P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994).
Under the exceptional circumstances version of the equitable discovery rule, the
court uses a balancing test and weighs “the hardship imposed on the claimants by the
application of the statue of limitations against any prejudice to the defendant resulting
from the passage of time.” Snow v. Rudd, 2000 UT 20, ¶ 11, 998 P.2d 262. However,
this balancing test has already been conducted in “cases involving beneficiaries’ claims of
trustee misconduct.” Id. In Snow, the court held that because of the “close familial
relationship involved” and because “the beneficiary will be less likely to question the
motives of the trustee and [is] less likely to sue.” the discovery rule needs to be applied to
prevent unjust results. Id. Consequently, the discovery rule is applied to “protect the
interests of a beneficiary” until “the beneficiary knows or should know of the alleged
breach of repudiation.” Id. In other words, when a case “involves a trust, a trustee cannot
take advantage of a statute of limitations defense until something has occurred to give the
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beneficiary a ‘clear indication’ that a breach or repudiation has occurred . . . .” Id.
(quoting Walker v. Walker, 17 Utah 2d 53, 58, 404 P.2d 253, 257 (Utah 1965); Acott v.
Tomlinson, 9 Utah 2d 71, 76-77, 337 P.2d 720, 724 (Utah 1959)). Therefore, in cases
involving a trust, the statute of limitations will not start running “until the beneficiary
knows or through reasonable investigation could have learned of a breach or repudiation.”
Id.
Under either version of the equitable discovery rule, the statute of limitation was
tolled in this case until weeks after Ellen’s death. Under the concealment version,
Petitioners’ evidence established a prima facie case that Ellen committed fraudulent
concealment when she failed to “speak the truth” regarding her changes to the trust. In
fact, the trial court specifically found that Petitioners were never notified of these
amendments or given copies of the trust documents. (R. at 1175-76.) Petitioners also
demonstrated that they neither knew nor should have known of the facts underlying their
cause of action until after Ellen’s death. Their agreement with Ellen was that she could
live on the Property until her death, at which time the Property would be transferred to
them. Thus, as the trial court found, until Petitioners learned of her death and her failure
to maintain the trust as agreed, they had no reason to question their stepmother. (R. at
1177-78.)
Under the exceptional circumstances version of the equitable discovery rule, Utah
courts have already determined that the discovery rule should be applied in “cases
involving beneficiaries’ claims of trustee misconduct” because of the “close familial
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relationship involved.” Thus, under the balancing test, the equities weigh in favor of the
discovery rule applying to Petitioners.
Evidence at trial showed that Petitioners did not discover the facts underlying their
claims against Ellen until weeks after her death. Ellen died on October 28, 2004. Weeks
later, Petitioners learned of her death and contacted her attorney to inquire about the
estate. (R. at 1177-78.) When they discovered that the trust terms had been modified to
exclude them, they immediately filed their petition on February 28, 2005, well within the
applicable four-year statute of limitation.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD PETITIONERS
THEIR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AS INCURRED IN THIS MATTER.
Petitioners should have been awarded their attorneys fees. Petitioners are entitled

to recoup their attorneys’ fees under two statutes found in the Probate Code:
“When not otherwise prescribed in this code, the court, or the Supreme
Court on appeal from the court, may, in its discretion, order costs to be paid
by any party to the proceedings or out of the assets of the estate as justice
may require.”
Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-310 (2009).
“If any . . . person nominated as personal representative defends or
prosecutes any proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not, he is
entitled to receive from the estate his necessary expenses and
disbursements, including reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred.”
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-719 (2009). Petitioners should be awarded their attorneys’ fees
as incurred in this matter under both sections 75-3-719 and 75-1-310.
Under section 75-1-310, justice requires that Petitioners be awarded their
attorneys’ fees as incurred in this matter. The trial court found that Ellen breached her
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fiduciary duties to Petitioners and defrauded them. But for her fraud and Respondent’s
deception, Petitioners would not have been forced to bring this suit, which has been
protracted and costly, to reverse that fraud. Ellen and her children should not be allowed
to perpetrate such hardship on Petitioners. The trial court erred in failing to find that
justice requires that Petitioners be awarded their attorneys’ fees.
Under section 75-3-719, Petitioners should be reimbursed by the estate for having
to bring this action. Ellen was the personal representative of Harold’s estate until her
death in 2004. See Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-609 (2009). Since that time, no successor
personal representative has been appointed. Petitioners made a motion to have Hal
LeFevre designated. Though not officially designated, Petitioners stood in the place of a
personal representative and brought this suit in good faith on behalf of the estate.
Petitioners should therefore be awarded from the estate his necessary expenses and
disbursements, including reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred. Since Harold’s estate is still
open and subject to the jurisdiction of the trial court, the trial court should have awarded
Petitioner his attorneys’ fees and costs.
Further, because Petitioners were entitled to their attorneys’ fees and costs in the
trial court, they should also be awarded their attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal. See
Glew v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 2007 UT 56, 181 P.3d 791.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RESPONDENT’S REQUEST
FOR A STAY PENDING APPEAL.
Respondent was not entitled to a stay pending appeal. Though, in some respects,

the issue of the stay pending appeal is now moot, this issue should be heard and decided
25

by this court because it is “capable of repetition yet evading review.” In re Johnson, 2001
UT 110, ¶ 15, 48 P.3d 881. The question of the appropriateness of a stay pending appeal
is always going to be moot on appeal. This Court should therefore decide the issue to
prevent future incorrect application of stay law.
Though an appellant generally has the option of giving a supersedeas bond and
obtaining a stay pending appeal, a stay and accompanying supersedeas bond is ineffective
and procedurally unnecessary where, as in this case, the judgment was self-executing.
See Utah R. Civ. P. 62(d). This idea has long been held in Utah law. The Utah Supreme
Court held early on that “where . . . the judgment is self-executing, and no act of a
ministerial officer is necessary to make it effective, an appeal does not suspend or
otherwise stay the force and effect of the judgment.” In re Grant, 44 Utah 386, 390, 140
P.2d 226, 228 (1914). In fact, the court held that “as a self executing judgment requires
no proceeding for its enforcement, there is nothing upon which a stay bond can operate in
the case of such a judgment. Id. (internal citations omitted).
Further, the public policy behind stays pending appeal and supersedeas bonds does
not apply to the self-executing judgment in this case. The “purpose and effect of
supersedeas is to restrain the successful party and the lower court from taking affirmative
action to enforce a judgment or decree.” Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 590 P.2d
1244, 1248 (Utah 1979) (emphasis added). In fact, a supersedeas bond “operates against
the enforcement of the judgment and not against the judgment itself.” Gumberts v. East
Oak Street Hotel Co., 88 N.E.2d 883, 885 (Ill. 1949) (emphasis added) (cited in Mills,
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590 P.2d at 1248 n.12).
In this case, the judgment is self-executing, in that it requires no proceeding or
action to be taken for its enforcement; the judgment is executed by its own terms. By
virtue of the judgment, Petitioners have title to the Property at issue. Thus, there is
nothing upon which a stay bond can operate.
The inappropriateness of a supersedeas bond in a case such as this is illustrated by
the fact that Petitioners cannot find and Respondent has not cited any authority for the
appropriate amount of a supersedeas bond in such a case. (R. 1193-1201.) Rule 62(j)
states that “a court shall set the supersedeas bond in an amount that adequately protects
the judgment creditor against loss or damage occasioned by the appeal and assures
payment in the event the judgment is affirmed.” Utah R. Civ. P. 62(j). Thus, the purpose
of the supersedeas bond is reaffirmed by the rule to be the protection of the party who
won the judgment in the first place. The purpose is not to protect the interests of the
judgment debtor should he perhaps obtain a reversal. In light of such a purpose, a
supersedeas bond was prohibited by the rules in this case because the judgment is selfexecuting.
Petitioners have been damaged by the entry of the stay. They have all of the
responsibilities and liabilities of homeowners without the power to protect their interest.
With use and direction of the Property out of their hands, they have been prevented from
selling the home prior to the crash of the real estate market. They are unable to rent and
maintain the home. They are unable to control the repair and condition of the home.
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They are incurring tax liabilities and liabilities for violations of Provo City ordinances. In
short, Petitioners have been wrongfully deprived of their ability to protect their interest in
the home. Because the trial court erroneously granted Respondent a stay pending appeal,
Petitioners should be awarded damages incurred as a result, including but not limited to
the rental value of the Property since the stay entered, the costs of repairing the home,
unpaid taxes, and any assessments or fees levied by Provo City because of the condition
of the Property.
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CONCLUSION
Therefore, in light of the foregoing, this Court should affirm the trial court’s
decision that Petitioners are the rightful owners of the Property. This Court should
reverse the trial court’s failure to award Petitioners their attorneys’ fees and remand for a
determination of attorneys’ fees in the trial court and on appeal. This Court should also
reverse the trial court’s improper stay pending appeal and remand for a determination of
damages.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23d day of January 2009.

HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, LC

_________________________________
Stephen Quesenberry
Attorneys for Petitioners/Appellees
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I hereby certify that, on the 23d day of January 2009, two true and correct copies
of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS were handdelivered to the following:
LESLIE W. SLAUGH (3752)
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
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Provo, Utah 84603
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